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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was br.ought to condemn for highway
purposes 7.8~ acres of pasture land owned by defendants
and used by them in the operation of a dairy farm in
Wasatch County. The entire tract, prior to the taking
for the highway, contained 131.79 acres (Tr. 4, Exhibit
A). After the taking, two small portions of pasture land
. were left to the north .of the new right-of-way, one consisting of 3.28 acres and the other, 1.21 acres. The case
was tried to the .court without a jury. The trial judge
determined the value of the property take~ to be $2,564.2·5, computed on the average value per acre of $325.00
(Finding of F·act No. 10). Plaintiffs accept this finding,
and _no issue is raised on appeal as to the judgment for
the value of the land actually taken.
In Finding of Fact No. 11 the trial court determined
the severance damages, or the damage to the remainder
of land not taken, to be $10,919.57, and entered judgment
accordingly. It is as to this portion of the judgment that
plaintiffs seek a review.
The 7.89 acres taken by plaintiffs was a portion of
a larger tract of pasturage, containing, before the taking,
131.79 acres (Tr. 4). Thi~_iproperty was acquired by defendants several years ago, and used in constructing and
operating a dairy ranch in conne-ction with the welfare
program of the Mormon church. It was not used as a
dairy pasturage prior to defendants' purchase (Tr. 22).
At the time of acquiring this tract, defendants acquired
another tract, to the north and west and across U. S.
4
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HiglnYay K o. 40. The~e t\\~O tracts \Vere clain1ed by defendant~

to be one unit and they asked for damages to·
the latter trart \Yith all ilnprovements thereon, although
the latter tract \Yas not touched in any way by this condemnation ...A.ll the in1prove1nents constructed by defendant~ in connection 'vith the creation and op·eration of the
dairy far1n 'vere placed upon the tract lying to the north
and 'vest of lT. S. High,vay 40, and no improvements
were constructed on the tract, a part of which plaintiff
took by this action.
Defendants, over plaintiff's objection,· presented
their case on the theory that the plain tiffs, by the taking
of 7.89 acres pasture land from the tract of 131.79 acres,
damaged the entire dairy farm as a going business; that
the entire farm, as an operating unit, had been severely
damaged by the taking of less than eight acres of pasture
land (Tr. 20ff). Defendants' witnesses testified, with
surprising unanimity, that the dairy farm, as an operating unit, had been depreciated twenty per cent, though
there was no evidence offered that a price had been offered for the unit, either before or after the taking by
plaintiff.
Defendants operated the farm by pasturing cattle
on the land owned or leased by them and feeding the
cattle in the \vinter with feed contributed by their members.
It is plaintiffs' position that defendants were entitled to the judgment of $2,564.25 for the 7.89 acres of
pasture land taken. We raise no question that defend5
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ants were also entitled to severance damages for the
depreciation in value of the two small portions of pasture
land left to the north of the land taken and thus cut off
from the defendants' main pasture land. We assert that
the allowance of $10,919.57 for severance damages cannot
be supported in law or on the evidence, and is on its face
error. Additional facts developed at the trial will be
indicated, in the course of the argument, in support of
our position.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE WILL NOT SUPPORT
THE DEFENDANTS' THEORY OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES
OR THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD THEREOF, FOR THE
REASON THAT THE DAIRY FARM IS NOT A UNIT OPERATION, AND ADDITIONAL PASTURE LAND WAS AVAILABLE TO DEFENDANTS.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE WILL NOT SUPPORT
THE DEFENDANTS' THEORY OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES
OR THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD THEREOF, FOR THE
REASON THAT THE DAIRY FARM IS NOT A UNIT OPERATION, AND ADDITIONAL PASTURE LAND WAS AVAILABLE TO DEFENDANTS.

6
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The statute here in question is Section 104-34-10,
Chapter 58, La\Ys of r:·tah 1951, \Yhich, so far as n1aterial
here, provides :
The court, jury or referee must hear such
legal eYidence as 1nay be offered by any of the
parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must
ascertain and assess:

*

*

*

*

(2) If the property sought to be condemned
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the
damages which \vill accrue to the portion not
sought to be condemned by reason of its severance
from the portion sought to be condemned and the
construction of the improvem_ents in the manner
proposed by the plaintiff.
There is no question in this case but what defendants
are entitled to severance damages to the two small parcels of pasture land to the north of the new right-of-way
by virtue of their being isolated from the remainder of
the pasturage. The allowance of $10,919.57 as severance
damages is so out of proportion to the value of that land,
were it deemed completely useless as a result of the
condemnation, that one can only conclude this amount
was awarded on the theory that the reduction in acreage
of pasture land damaged the entire dairy operation, and
that it was impossible to replace such land. This theory,
the law and the facts will not support. The measure of
damages in such a case as this ~s the diminution in value
of the remaining tract, caused by the taking. State et al
v. Ward et al, 112 Utah 452, 189 P. 2d 113. The defend7
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ants' dairy simply was not diminished in value to that extent by the taking of approximately 6% of its p·asturag~.
As pointed out, defendants' witnesses were practically u~animous in their assertion that the dairy, . as a
going business,. was depreciated through the taking by
twenty per cent. They were not unanimous in their basis
for arriving at this figure. Th~ir case was probably best
stated by their witness, H. Clay Cummings. He testified,
over plaintiffs' objection, that he valued the property at
$100,000.00 before and $80,000.00 after the taking (Tr.
33). He arrived at the value of the farm by taking into
consideration the 3.:mount e_xpended by defendants in improving it.. This, we submit, is not the prQper measure,
State v. Ward, supra. On cross examination he testified
that he arriv~d at the valu~ of $80,000.00 after the taking
by depreciating, by 20%, all the improvements constructed including the 'house, dairy barns, corrals and
even the personal p-rop·erty such as pitchforks etc. used
on the farm (Tr. 34~44). And this, though none of the
improvements were on the tract, a portion of which was
taken!
The testimony of Mr. Broadbent, Professor of Agriculture at the Utah State Agricultural College (Tr. 98
ff) indicates that he arrived at the 20 percent depreciation in the value of the dairy farm by a somewhat different process. He testified that the improvements built on
the dairy ranch had a capacity of ap·proximately 100
cows, and that they should have at least 60 as a mini1num
for economical op·eration (Tr. 100). His testimony was to
8
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the effect that the taking of the 7.89 acres by the State
reduced the pasturage to the point where it would not
support the n1inin1um economical number of cows. This
testimony "'"as offered on the theory that the land taken·
\vas absolutely irreplaceable. ....l\..part from the legal questions involved, the facts si1nply will not support this
theory...A.s \Vill be shown hereafter, other land was available to the defendants for use as pasturage. Further,
pasture land in that vicinity is usable as such for at most
six months of the year (Tr. 51, 52, 219). Defendants produce or raise no other feed for their cattle, but rather
procure it fro1n their membership as contributions (Tr.
52, 219). All feed except for pasturage is procured by defendants from contributions of members of the Stake and
none of it is produced on the dairy farm (Tr. 220). Further, at the time of the trial, more than a year after the
taking of the property by the plaintiffs, the defendants
were running more cattle (Tr. 51) than before, and no
testimony was offered showing that efficiency or production had changed by the taking. Mr. Young testified
(Tr. 217) that prior to the taking defendants ran from
100 to 105 head of cattle and at the tune of the. trial, 110
head of cattle (Tr. 218). In fact production increased.
For the year ending October 1946, defendants milked an
average of 20 cows (Exh. C). F·or the year ending October 1947, they milked 22 cows (Exh. D) and for the year
ending in October after the taking of the land by the state
they milked an average of 47 cows (Exh. E).
,

The only theory, if any there be, upon which the
award of $10,919.57 severance damages can be main9
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tained is that the total pasturage available to defendants prior to the taking by the plaintiff of the 7.89 acres
is absolutely essent~al to the operation of the defendants'
dairy farm, that this land is irreplaceable, and that the
entire dairy operation has been damaged, in addition to
the land taken, to that extent. The facts will not support
this theory because the record shows that additional
land was available. First, at the time of the taking the
defendants were renting from the New Park Mining
· Company an area · of approximately 160 acres to the
north of the present properties (Tr. 229-30), and were
expending time and money improving this property. In
addition thereto the record shows that at the time of
the taking of this property the State offered to procure
from one Don Berg 15.3 acres immediately adjacent to
the defendants' pasture land to the south and east, separated from the present pasture tract by only a fence (Tr.
72, 313). The record further shows that this pasturage is
as good as the rest of the pasture land of the defendants
and could easily be used by it in connection with its dairy
operation. The defendants simply were not restricted
in available pasture acreage by this action.
~

We believe the law regarding severance damages
where a part only of the tract is taken is well stated in
4 Nichols, Eminent Domain, (3rd edition) p. 307-308.
In determining the extent of an owner's remainder area and its relationship to the parcel
taken consideration is given to the physical con- .
ditions which exist and not to the manne-r in which
the land is utilized by an owner. The parcel taken
10
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and the re1nainder area must, prior to the taking,
haYe constituted a single physical unit. Where
t'Yo physically separated tracts of the same owner
are operated as a unit by the owner and only one
of such tracts is affected by a partial taking, the
unity of operation is not in and of itself sufficient
to Ineri t consideration of the second tract as part
of the remainder area.
This court in the case of Provo River Water Use-rs'
Association v. Carleson et al., 103 Utah 93, 133 P. 2d
277 considered a siinilar problem. There, the plaintiffs
had condemn~d pastureland belonging to the defendant,
the taking of 'vhich, defendant claimed, had damaged the
remainder of his farm. The jury rendered a ve-rdict
granting such damages. The court reversed, ·stating:
.rill of the cases in this court, which we have
been able to find, h~ve predicated both severance
damages and damages to lands not taken, on .some
physical injury to lands not condemned, such as
lowering or raising the level. of a street or high-.
way so as to impair access, obstruction of light
and view, restriction of the remaining area in
size or shape so as to render it less valuable for
purposes to which it was formerly adapted, or
the creation of noise, smoke, or some other condition which would operate to depreciate tlie market
value of the property remaining.

In the cited case it was further pointed out that the
facts would not support the plaintiffs' theory of severance damages in any event for the reason that there was
no indication in the record that additional land was not
available to the defendant. In this case, there is no question but that additional land was available to the defend11
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ants. Fnrther, this additional land was offered to the defendants and th~y refused to buy it (Tr. 77). It is true
the defendants' witness testified that they refused to purchase this additional land because the price was too high
($4,000.00) but even if we were to grant that it was high
this is indeed strange behavior on behalf of the defendants when they assert that the taking of the 7.89 acres
substantially destroy~d the efficiency of their entire
operation. Furthermore, in the instant case there is no
evidence that aceess to the remaining property was impaired, no evidence it cannot be used for the same purposes as previously; no evidence o.f smoke or noise or
anything that would depreciate the· market value of the
remaining property.
We appreciate the rule of law that the defendant in
a condemnation case is entitled to· the value of the lands
taken and the damages to the remainder, if any, in money
and that h~ cannot be compelled to accept substitute land
elsewhere. However, as pointed out in the case of City
o:f St. Louis v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 272 Mo. 80,
197 S.W. 107 the matter of the availability of additional
land is mate·rial in the question of damages to· the remainder and to a going business conducted upon the remainder. This testimony that the Berg property consisting of 15.3 acres separated from the defendants'
pasture ·by merely a fence, completely destroys the defendants.' theory that by the taking of 7.89 acres from the
131.79 acres the defendants' operation has been reduced
·below the efficient minimum level and thus ·damaged the
dairy farm irreparably.
12
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This theory is further destroyed by the testilnony
offered on behalf of the defendants that a year and a half
after the taking of the 7.89 acres defendants we·re running more cattle than they 'vere prior to the taking and
that the defendants "\vere continuously engaged in improving the additional lands so as to increase the pasture
carrying capacity of the farn1. Defendants' theory is
further destroyed by testimony offered on their behalf
that all of the feed for their cattle comes from sources
separate and apart from the farm in question. They
would have us believe that the dairy farm in Wasatch
County is a self-contained unit operated as such selfcontained unit when in fact it is not. The record shows
that the defendants at the time of trial had approximately 110 head of cattle on the farm (Tr. 218) yet according to the testimony the best portions of the 131.79
acre tract would support only two cows per acre and the
poorest a mere fraction of a cow per acre during the six
months pasture season. Furthermore, one of the defendants' witnesses testified that the improvements consisting of the feeding and lounging facilities had a capacity
of 60 cows and at the time of the trial defendants were
feeding and lounging approximately 55 head (Tr. 226227). This sarne witness testified that some dairies are
operated commercially without any or with very little
pasturage (Tr. 225-226).

CONCLUSION
Defendants, over plaintiffs' objection, were permit-

13
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ted to try their case on the theory that the Wasatch
c·ounty dairy farrn was a unit operation, and that the
taking of the 7.89 acres by plaintiffs destroyed the efficient operation of the unit. To support this theory, it
was necessary for defendants to establish the unity of
operation, and that additional pasture land was not available to replace that taken. The trial court, in awarding
severance damages of $10,919.57; adopted this theory.
We respectfully submit that the evidence will support neither premise. The dairy farm was in fact never
operated as a unit geared in its capacity to the size and
nature of the pasture land available, and the evidence
further shows that additional pasturage in ample
amounts was, at the time of the taking, available to defendants.
Defendants are unquestionably entitled to severance damages for the two small tracts lying to the east
and north of the right-of-way taken. They are not entitled to the sum awarded. We ask this court to remand
the case for the purpose of properly assessing such
severance damages.

· C·LINTON D. VERNON
Attorney General

J. LAMBERT GIBSON
Deputy Attorney General
ALLEN B. SORENSEN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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